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ELENA KAGAN CAN’T SAY THAT: THE SORRY 
STATE OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE REGARDING 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
NEIL J. KINKOPF

 
MEMORANDUM FOR THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
From: Ray L. Politik, Counsel to the President  
 
Re:  Proposed Statement of Elena Kagan to the U.S. Senate, 
Committee on the Judiciary, on her nomination to be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States 
  
Date: June 2010 
_______________________________________________________ 
I have reviewed the draft statement that Elena Kagan has proposed 
submitting to the Senate Judiciary Committee.
1
 In this statement, Dean 
Kagan seeks to educate the Judiciary Committee and the American people 
to think differently about the enterprise of constitutional interpretation. 
This is a highly quixotic mission with very little chance of success and 
tremendous potential to do damage to you and to the judiciary. It is, 
therefore, my recommendation that you urge Elena Kagan, in the strongest 
terms possible, not to submit the proposed statement.
2
 If this effort at 
persuasion fails, I recommend that you withdraw her nomination. 
 
 
  Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. From 2009–2010, I worked in 
the Department of Justice as Counselor to the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal 
Policy. The views expressed in this Commentary do not express the views of the Department of Justice 
or the administration. Moreover, nothing expressed in this Commentary reflects nonpublic or other 
―inside‖ information. 
 1. Eric J. Segall, What Elena Kagan Could Have and Should Have Said (and Still Have Been 
Confirmed), 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 535 (2010). 
 2. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that Dean Kagan make any statement she believes to be 
untrue. I do believe she can honestly make a statement such as that given by Justice Sotomayor during 
her confirmation hearing: 
In the past month, many Senators have asked me about my judicial philosophy. Simple: 
fidelity to the law. The task of a judge is not to make law. It is to apply the law. 
 . . . . 
 . . . That is why I generally structure my opinions by setting out what the law requires 
and then explaining why a contrary position, sympathetic or not, is accepted or rejected.  
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Dean Kagan proposes to declare that ―the ‗law‘ often runs out in 
difficult constitutional cases. At that point, a Justice has no choice but to 
bring her personal values, experiences, and judgments to the process. The 
law, alone, is simply not enough to decide these cases.‖3 I want to make it 
clear at the outset that I do not, in this memo, take issue with the substance 
of this view.
4
 My objections are, rather, strategic. In short, Dean Kagan‘s 
confirmation hearing is neither the time nor the place to challenge the 
prevailing notion of how judges should interpret the Constitution. 
The conservative legal movement
5
 has succeeded in planting in the 
minds of much of the American public the idea that there are two types of 
judges: the liberal, activist judge and the conservative judge. Conservative 
judges promise to interpret the Constitution according to its text and the 
original understanding of that text, and without reference to values, 
experience, or other considerations that are external to the Constitution‘s 
text as originally understood.
6
 Liberal, activist judges, by contrast, are said 
to interpret the Constitution according to their own values and experiences 
in order to ―do justice‖ in the cases they decide. The conservative 
 
 
 That is how I seek to strengthen both the rule of law and faith in the impartiality of our 
judicial system. My personal and professional experiences help me to listen and understand, 
with the law always commanding the result in every case. 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 59 (2009) 
(statement of Sonia Sotomayor, Nominee to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States). 
 3. Segall, supra note 1. 
 4. I also do not mean to endorse Dean Kagan‘s position. While I agree that the Constitution‘s 
text is frequently indeterminate as applied to contemporary controversies, I believe that such 
controversies are best resolved by reference to the values embodied within the Constitution itself, 
rather than by reference to a Justice‘s own personal values. It is true that the Constitution encompasses 
a range of values that are frequently in tension—national security and individual liberty, for example. 
Yet, I believe that the best construction of constitutional meaning lies in the balancing of these 
constitutional values according to accepted modes of judicial interpretation; here, I mean something 
roughly like the modalities set forth in Philip Bobbitt‘s important book, Constitutional Fate. For an 
excellent survey of these modalities as actually employed in Supreme Court constitutional 
interpretation, see LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE SUPREME 
COURT READS THE CONSTITUTION (2009). An individual Justice‘s personal values and life experiences 
may have some relevance to the Justice‘s actual practice of accommodating competing and conflicting 
constitutional values, but, for the reasons set forth in the balance of this memo, I believe that 
discussing this topic is, at least, distracting. 
 5. I refer to the movement described in STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE 
LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW (2008).  
 6. There are, of course, many differing approaches to originalism, but these differences are of 
no significance to resolving the matter at hand. I should also note that many originalists are willing to 
concede that a judge must also take account of judicial precedent in construing the Constitution and 
that, on occasion, precedent may require the judge to adhere to an interpretation that is at odds with 
original understanding.  
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approach is taken to be legitimate because it maintains the neutrality of the 
interpreter and prevents the judge from imposing his or her own policy 
preferences. The liberal, activist approach is understood to be illegitimate 
because it releases the objective constraints (the text and original 
understanding) that prevent a judge from altering the meaning of the 
Constitution. Thus, liberal, activist judges are frequently derided as 
―legislating from the bench.‖ 
The conservative model of what a judge is supposed to do when 
interpreting the Constitution was famously stated by Chief Justice John 
Roberts in his opening statement at his own confirmation hearing:  
Judges and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way 
around. Judges are like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules; they 
apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They 
make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. 
Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the umpire.
7
  
Even though this formulation had tremendous public appeal, it does not 
tell us very much about what it means for a judge to call balls and strikes. 
In fact, it didn‘t need to. That job—setting forth the substance of the 
proper, nonactivist method of constitutional interpretation—had been done 
already by numerous commentators. Robert Bork has written several 
books since his own failed nomination to the Supreme Court explaining 
the enterprise. Mark Levin, the conservative talk-show host and writer on 
legal issues, sums up Bork‘s work thusly:  
originalism ―appeal[s] to a common sense of what judges‘ roles 
ought to be in a properly functioning constitutional democracy. 
Judges are not to overturn the will of legislative majorities absent a 
violation of a constitutional right, as those rights were understood 
by the framers. . . . Originalism seeks to promote the rule of law by 
imparting to the Constitution a fixed, continuous, and predictable 
meaning.‖8  
Former Justice David Souter has recently attempted to expose the myth 
at the heart of this dichotomy between conservative and activist judges. In 
 
 
 7. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John G. 
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
 8. MARK LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK 13 (2005) (quoting John E. Thompson, Note, What’s the Big 
Deal: The Unconstitutionality of God in the Pledge of Allegiance, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 563, 
581 (2003)). 
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his commencement address at Harvard University, he offered an 
extraordinarily subtle and thoughtful critique of the judge-as-umpire 
model and an equally compelling case for values-based judging. His effort 
is worth an extended excerpt: 
The [umpire]
9
 model fails to account for what the Constitution 
actually says, and it fails just as badly to understand what judges 
have no choice but to do. The Constitution is a pantheon of values, 
and a lot of hard cases are hard because the Constitution gives no 
simple rule of decision for the cases in which one of the values is 
truly at odds with another. Not even its most uncompromising and 
unconditional language can resolve every potential tension of one 
provision with another, tension the Constitution‘s Framers left to be 
resolved another day; and another day after that, for our cases can 
give no answers that fit all conflicts, and no resolutions [sic] 
immune to rethinking when the significance of old facts may have 
changed in the changing world. These are reasons enough to show 
how egregiously it misses the point to think of judges in 
constitutional cases as just sitting there reading constitutional 
phrases fairly and looking at reported facts objectively to produce 
their judgments. Judges have to choose between the good things that 
the Constitution approves, and when they do, they have to choose, 
not on the basis of measurement, but of meaning. 
 . . . . 
 So, it is tempting to dismiss the critical rhetoric of lawmaking 
and activism as simply a rejection of too many of the hopes we 
profess to share as the American people. But there is one thing 
more. I have to believe that something deeper is involved, and that 
behind most dreams of a simpler Constitution there lies a basic 
human hunger for the certainty and control that the [umpire] model 
seems to promise. 
 . . . . 
 
 
 9. Justice Souter uses the phrase ―fair reading model‖ to refer to the judge-as-umpire approach. 
I believe that is a more accurate description even than originalism. Justice Scalia‘s important 
articulation of the model makes it clear that his method is actually best described as textualism rather 
than originalism, which is consistent with Justice Souter‘s label. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997). Nevertheless, the tag ―originalism‖ has 
taken hold in public discourse, and even Justice Scalia does not attempt to revise this.   
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/7
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 But I have come to understand . . . that I differ from the critics 
I‘ve described . . . . Where I suspect we differ most fundamentally is 
in my belief that in an indeterminate world I cannot control, it is 
still possible to live fully in the trust that a way will be found 
leading through the uncertain future. And to me, the future of the 
Constitution as the Framers wrote it can be staked only upon that 
same trust.
10
 
This is nearly identical to the argument Dean Kagan proposes to make 
in her draft statement. While the publicity of Justice Souter‘s speech did 
not approach the publicity attending a Supreme Court confirmation 
hearing, the speech was very widely publicized. The reaction to Justice 
Souter‘s speech is not an encouraging precedent for Dean Kagan‘s 
proposal. For example, the Boston Globe‘s story covering the speech was 
headlined, ―Souter Defends Judicial Activism; Says Perspectives Change 
with Time.‖11  
Justice Stephen Breyer has just published a book, Making Our 
Democracy Work, which follows his 2005 book, Active Liberty, and 
continues his project of explaining and justifying the role of the judiciary 
in our constitutional system. The review published in The New York 
Times, by a former aide to President Clinton who is sympathetic to 
Breyer‘s project, notes that the book arrives ―at a time when legal thinkers 
on the left are struggling to develop a jurisprudence with anything like the 
clarity (or, rather, the certainty) of that on the right.‖12  
Perhaps most directly on point, you have nominated Professor 
Goodwin Liu to be a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. Professor Liu is exceptionally well qualified and has a 
compelling life story. Senate Republicans, however, have been blocking 
his nomination on the grounds that he will be an activist. Their evidence? 
A book
13
 he co-wrote espousing an approach to constitutional 
interpretation that conservatives claim is not originalist.
14
 The views that 
 
 
 10. Justice David H. Souter, Text of Justice Souter’s Speech: Harvard Commencement Remarks 
(As Delivered), HARVARD GAZETTE, May 27, 2010, http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2010/05/ 
text-of-justice-david-souters-speech/.  
 11. Jonathan Saltzman, Souter Defends Judicial Activism; Says Perspectives Change with Time, 
BOS. GLOBE, May 28, 2010, at 4, available at www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/ 
2010/05/28/souter_defends_judicial_activism/. Of course, Justice Souter said nothing of the sort. 
 12. Jeff Shesol, Evolving Circumstances, Enduring Values, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at BR14, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/books/review/Shesol-t.html. 
 13. GOODWIN LIU, PAMELA S. KARLAN & CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, KEEPING FAITH WITH 
THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 14. See, e.g., Shannon Bream, Obama 9th Circuit Nominee: Constitution Must Adapt to Changes 
in the World, FOXNEWS.COM, Mar. 4, 2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/03/04/obama-th-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Liu and his coauthors set forth are similar to those expressed by Justices 
Souter and Breyer and, if anything, milder than those in Dean Kagan‘s 
draft statement. Predictably, Republicans claim that ―Liu believes that 
judges have the authority to impose their views . . . using clever verbal 
camouflage to disguise what they're doing.‖15 Professor Liu‘s nomination 
remains stalled and was returned to the White House without action at the 
Senate‘s last recess. 
These examples, chosen from among legions available, demonstrate 
that the conservatives have succeeded in defining the debate: a judge is 
either a judicial activist or a conservative. If Dean Kagan gives the 
proposed remarks, she will clearly brand herself a judicial activist, just as 
Justice Souter did in his Harvard commencement address. This will open 
her to demagoguery by conservatives on the Judiciary Committee and by 
right-wing media commentators and bloggers. This, in turn, will seriously 
jeopardize her prospects for confirmation.  
Dean Kagan is, I believe, well aware of this common misconception 
regarding ―judicial activism.‖ Her proposal, then, seems bottomed on the 
perception that her confirmation hearing could provide a ―teachable 
moment,‖ after which the public understanding of constitutional 
interpretation will change in some important respect. Even though Dean 
Kagan is a magnificent teacher, this project is doomed to fail because 
confirmation hearings are not teachable moments.  
I know you are familiar with the confirmation battle waged over the 
nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court. Tremendous attention—
I would say unprecedented attention—was given to his theory of 
constitutional interpretation and its potential consequences for the country. 
If ever a Supreme Court nomination provided the nation a teachable 
moment, it was Robert Bork‘s. After this full airing of views, Judge 
Bork‘s nomination was rejected by a bipartisan vote. The lesson of this 
teachable moment should have been that originalism is not a credible 
method of constitutional interpretation. Yet, the lure of originalism and its 
false promise of objective, neutral judging has grown stronger since that 
event.  
Public understanding of the Constitution‘s meaning and the role of 
interpretation forms gradually over time, rather than in a galvanizing 
 
 
circuit-nominee-constitution-adapt-changes-world/ (noting that opposition to his writings focuses on 
his book on constitutional interpretation).   
 15. Id. (quoting Ed Whelan, a leading conservative pundit on legal issues and president of the 
Ethics and Public Policy Center).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss2/7
  
 
 
 
 
2010] ELENA KAGAN CAN‘T SAY THAT 549 
 
 
 
 
teachable moment. As an example, take Brown v. Board of Education.
16
 
Brown itself was the culmination of decades of strategizing by Charles 
Hamilton Houston, the NAACP, and other thinkers and organizations, 
carried into execution by Thurgood Marshall and a team of lawyers in a 
painstaking series of cases designed to pave the way for the overruling of 
Plessy v. Ferguson‘s17 doctrine of ―separate but equal.‖ Once decided, 
Brown actually did little to engender racial equality,
18
 but it provided 
strong moral and rhetorical force for the civil rights movement. It enabled 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., to declare, ―If we are wrong, then the 
Supreme Court of this Nation is wrong. If we are wrong, the Constitution 
of the United States is wrong. If we are wrong, God Almighty is wrong.‖19 
It was another decade before Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to establish the principle of 
nondiscrimination in American law. 
More to the point, the conservative legal movement that has convinced 
the public that its method of interpretation is legitimate and that other 
methods are activist did not succeed overnight. Rather, it had its roots in 
the opposition to Brown, which gave rise to the Southern strategy of 
Richard Nixon, including his railing against liberal, activist judges. The 
movement was later advanced through the founding and impressive work 
of the Federalist Society and the broad network of conservative legal 
scholars and practitioners that it fostered.
20
 When John Roberts pitched his 
umpire metaphor, it represented a culmination, rather than an origination, 
for the conservative legal movement. As noted above, the umpire 
metaphor was forceful, not because then-Judge Roberts used his hearing as 
a teachable moment, but because of the tremendous amount of prior spade 
work that had been done to make the public receptive to his sloganeering. 
We have no similar public support, nor do we have a significant 
constituency that demands that we seek to promote a progressive legal 
agenda. Consider two contrasting examples. The Heritage Foundation, in 
2005, published Mandate for Leadership, which conservatives hoped 
would be a blueprint for George W. Bush‘s second term. Former attorney 
general Edwin Meese coauthored a chapter entitled, ―Restoring the Proper 
 
 
 16. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 17. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 18. See generally GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008). 
 19. See Martin Luther King, Jr., Speech at the Holt Street Baptist Church (Dec. 5, 1955), 
available at http://www.blackvoices.com/black_news/canvas_directory_headlines_features/feature_ 
article?id=20060111182609990001. 
 20. For an outstanding exploration of this phenomenon, see TELES, supra note 5. 
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Role of the Courts.‖ In this chapter, he asserted that the rule of law means 
that ―the U.S. Constitution and laws are supreme and have fixed, objective 
meanings . . . . The Constitution is very much alive and relevant to 
protecting our freedoms today, but it does not vary in its meaning or 
protections depending on the fashionable trends or notions of any era.‖21 
After setting forth this ―principle,‖ Mr. Meese sets out the operational 
objective to carry this principle into effect: ―Nominate and confirm to 
federal courts only individuals who have a proven record of fidelity to the 
Constitution, the rule of law, and the proper role of a federal judge.‖22 He 
goes on to explain this objective:  
The President and Senators should conduct a careful inquiry into a 
potential federal judge‘s judicial philosophy, or the methodology he 
would use when deciding cases. It is not enough for a nominee 
simply to pledge to follow the rule of law without explaining what 
that means. A record of scholarship, prior opinions, or a discussion 
of important constitutional provisions should be pursued to 
determine whether the nominee appreciates what the rule of law 
requires, which includes a commitment to interpret and apply the 
Constitution and laws as they were written and were originally 
intended to operate.
23
  
In 2008, by contrast, the Center for American Progress—the 
progressive version of the Heritage Foundation—published a book that 
was intended as a blueprint for the next presidential term.
24
 It did not 
include an entry on judicial appointments or the role of the judiciary. This 
was not an oversight.
25
 Rather, it reflects the absence of a significant 
constituency demanding a progressive approach to constitutional issues. 
Until such a constituency forms, it would be foolish to spend political 
capital on a Supreme Court nomination fight. In the absence of such a 
 
 
 21. Edwin Meese III & Todd F. Gaziano, Restoring the Proper Role of the Courts, in HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION, MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP: PRINCIPLES TO LIMIT GOVERNMENT, EXPAND FREEDOM, 
AND STRENGTHEN AMERICA 17, 18 (2005). 
 22. Id. at 19. 
 23. Id. 
 24. See CHANGE FOR AMERICA: A PROGRESSIVE BLUEPRINT FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENT (Mark 
Green & Michelle Jolin eds., 2008).  
 25. The Center for American Progress published a paper on judicial appointments on its website 
along with papers on a variety of other subjects that did not make the cut for inclusion in the published 
book. See SIMON LAZARUS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS ACTION FUND, JUDICIAL NOMINATIONS: 
IMPLEMENTING THE RULE OF LAW (2005), http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2008/change 
foramerica/pdf/judicial1.pdf. 
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constituency, a Supreme Court confirmation battle will yield no benefit to 
your administration.  
Finally, allowing Dean Kagan to proceed with her draft statement 
would be contrary to the consistent policy of this administration.
26
 To date, 
we have refused to spend any political capital on judicial nominees, or any 
other nominees for that matter. The reason for this policy is simple: this 
administration has too many important matters to contend with to be 
distracted by personnel matters. Indeed, spending political capital on 
nominations diminishes the store of capital available for this 
administration to pursue the historically important reforms that you were 
elected to achieve. The list, as you know better than anyone, is extensive. 
The highlights include reforming health care, enacting an economic 
stimulus to respond to the gravest economic crisis in seventy years, 
reforming the banking and financial sector, responding to climate change, 
fighting the war on terror, prosecuting two wars simultaneously, 
responding to the perceived immigration crisis, containing the oil leak in 
the Gulf of Mexico, and promoting energy security.  
These problems demand near-term action, and the American people 
elected you to provide leadership in resolving them; they did not elect you 
to supply them with the breads and circuses of the culture wars. This is 
why we immediately retreated from using the term ―empathy‖ when doing 
so became so controversial in the context of the last Supreme Court 
nomination, that of Justice Sonia Sotomayor.
27
 Even if Dean Kagan is 
 
 
 26. Author‘s note: I have gleaned the administration‘s policy from its actions and not from any 
information gained while I was in government service. 
 27. For an example of the backlash that the use of this word generated, see Karl Rove, 
“Empathy” Is Code for Judicial Activism, WALL ST. J., May 28, 2009, at A13, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124347199490860831.html. Each of the Republican senators on the 
Judiciary Committee took issue with the legitimacy of employing empathy in judging during his 
opening remarks on the confirmation hearing of Justice Sotomayor. The comments of the Ranking 
Member, Senator Sessions, are emblematic:  
I have to say, as a result of President Obama‘s views that, in tough cases, the critical 
ingredient for a judge is the ―depth and breadth of one‘s empathy,‖ as well as, his word, ―their 
broader vision of what America should be.‖ 
 Like the American people, I have watched this process for a number of years, and I fear 
that this ―empathy standard‖ is another step down the road to a liberal activist, results-
oriented, and relativistic world where laws lose their fixed meaning, unelected judges set 
policy, Americans are seen as members of separate groups rather than as simply Americans, 
and where the constitutional limits on Government power are ignored when politicians want 
to buy out private companies. So we have reached a fork in the road, I think, and there are 
stark differences.  
 I want to be clear:  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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willing to supply her cause (a cause that does not appear to have many 
followers) with a martyr on the example of Robert Bork, your agenda is 
too important to allow her to do so.  
I do not wish to suggest that you simply cede the battle to the 
conservatives. Instead, I suggest that you begin to explore ways that your 
administration might begin to promote the sort of grassroots constituency 
that is an indispensable precondition for creating a progressive 
constitutional agenda. There are groups, such as the American 
Constitution Society and the Alliance for Justice, that are actively engaged 
in these issues. They do excellent work, but there may be ways that we can 
help them. If so, this could prove to be an important part of your legacy as 
President.  
 
 
 I will not vote for—and no senator should vote for—an individual nominated by any 
President who is not fully committed to fairness and impartiality toward every person who 
appears before them. 
 I will not vote for—and no Senator should vote for—an individual nominated by any 
President who believes it is acceptable for a judge to allow their personal background, gender, 
prejudices, or sympathies to sway their decision in favor of, or against, parties before the 
court. 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 6–7 (2009) 
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).   
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